

After-Action Report Addendum for Critical Life-Threatening Incident

Date: January 13, 2023

To: Ms. Kate Bryan, Executive Director, Maryland Center for School Safety

From: Edward A. Clarke, Chief Safety Officer, Department of Systemwide Safety and Emergency Management

Subject: After-Action Report Addendum for the Critical Life-Threatening Incident at Colonel Zadok Magruder High School that occurred on January 21, 2022.

Background

Dr. Monifa B. McKnight, Montgomery County Public Schools (MCPS) Superintendent of Schools directed that an additional review of the facts and circumstances of the Colonel Zadok Magruder High School (Magruder High School) shooting be initiated following the issuance of the After-Action Report submitted May 13, 2022 to the Maryland Center for School Safety. In a continued effort to build and rebuild trust with our community and in response to the many community requests for more information MCPS has completed an addendum providing new information, observations and lessons learned. The review was conducted by an internal team that was not involved in the direct response to the Magruder High School shooting that occurred on January 21, 2022.

Dr. Patrick K. Murphy, MCPS Deputy Superintendent was appointed by Dr. McKnight to lead the internal review and assemble a team to assist in conducting the review. The following MCPS staff were appointed by Dr. Murphy to be a part of the review team.

- Dr. Floyd-Cooper, Associate Superintendent, Office of School Support and Well-Being
- Mr. Mullenholz, Director, Office of School Support and Well-Being
- Ms. Iszard, Executive Assistant, Office of the School System Medical Officer
- Mr. Clarke, Chief Safety Officer, Department of Systemwide Safety and Emergency Management

The review conducted by the team included:

- Over 40 interviews that included school staff, central office staff, parents, students, public safety responders and officials, and meetings with Magruder High School staff
- Review of 911 call to Montgomery County Police Emergency Communications Center
- On-site visits and walkthroughs of the facilities at Magruder High School
- Review of school security camera footage

After-Action Report Addendum

The purpose of this report is to address new information learned, incident observations, lessons learned, and follow-up actions taken following the submission of the After-Action Report submitted to the Maryland Center for School Safety on May 13, 2022. This addendum serves as an update and a supplement to the initial After-Action Report. The information contained in this addendum is meant to be cross-referenced with the original information provided in the May 13, 2022 [After-Action Report for Critical Life-Threatening Incident](#) document.

On November 30, 2022, the review team facilitated a community meeting at Magruder High School where a review of initial observations and more information was shared. This meeting included the participation of Montgomery County Police (MCP), Montgomery County Fire and Rescue Service, and Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office. During the meeting, the team shared updates to the MCPS incident response protocols since the release of the initial report. The information in this addendum reflects what was shared at the meeting and other questions that surfaced by the community at that time. Below are key content areas of the review that include updated incident observations, lessons learned, and follow-up actions taken by the system as a result of January 21, 2022, incident at Magruder High School and the subsequent incident review. The addendum is separated into the following topics:

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Definitions

The following terms are throughout the addendum, and the definitions of these terms are important to understand the contents of this report.

- **Observations** are the facts, circumstances, and information ascertained as part of the review process.
- **Lessons Learned** is the knowledge and information gained from the review process with the goal of improving future responses to a school-related emergency or critical incident.
- **Follow-Up Action Taken** are the steps or measures taken in addressing the observations and lessons learned from the review process with the goal of improving the efficiency, effectiveness, and outcomes when responding to a school-related emergency or critical incident.
- **Incident Command Structure (ICS)** is an internal system structure that delineates roles and responsibilities for MCPS staff in responding to a serious incident.
- **Unified Command (UC)** is the alignment of multiple agencies that are responding to an emergency in a manner that allows these agencies to collaborate effectively and efficiently without minimizing any individual agency’s authority, responsibility, or accountability¹.

Updated Incident Timeline

An updated timeline of the January 21, 2022, incident is being provided as an appendix to this document. (Page 12)

¹ “Federal Emergency Management Agency Training Glossary” FEMA, December 29, 2022, <https://training.fema.gov/programs/emischool/el361toolkit/glossary.htm>.

Life Saving Measures by Magruder High School Staff and Montgomery County Fire and Rescue Service (MCFRS)

Observations

- At 12:53 p.m., while on a proactive hallway patrol, the Magruder High School Security Team Leader (STL) noticed a small group of students running from the C-Hall boy's bathroom and the STL made entry into the bathroom to investigate.
- Upon entry, the STL discovered a student who was severely injured. Initially, it was suspected to be a stab wound to the lower abdomen due to a knife being located and removed from the waistband of the victim.
- The STL began administering life-saving first aid and called over the school radio to request assistance from the school nurse and administrators, and directing that a call be made to 911.
- The school administrative team, the school nurse, a security assistant, and a teacher responded to the bathroom to address the situation and provide medical assistance.
- The “Stop the Bleed Kit” was located directly across from the bathroom and was provided to the school nurse, who used the contents to administer life-saving first aid to the student.
- A front office staffer made the 911 call, and the administrative secretary relayed vital information to the dispatcher. The information regarding what was occurring in the bathroom was being conveyed to the front office staff by those who responded to the bathroom to provide assistance.
- The nurse subsequently determined that the injury appeared to be consistent with a gunshot wound and alerted the school administrative team.
- Recognizing the potential life-threatening nature of the incident, the school principal physically ran back to the office to place the school into a building-wide lockdown.
- Information provided by MCFRS indicates that, according to the timeline they provided, a paramedic unit was added as part of the response based on the severity of the student’s injury due to a potential stabbing.
- MCFRS responded to Magruder High School and planned to stage at the Casey House property adjacent to the school. MCFRS protocol is to wait until the scene of a critical incident is deemed safe to enter by law enforcement before providing any medical attention to injured parties. The Engine Captain was following this safety protocol. However, he observed school staff members waving/flagging and, as such, made the call to proceed, as it was determined to be safe to respond directly to the bathroom without the support of law enforcement to coordinate the emergency medical assessment of the student and to continue life-saving measures after taking over treatment from the school nurse and team leader. Once in the bathroom, MCFRS responders learned via face-to-face communication that the student was suffering from a gunshot wound.
- The student was stabilized and transported to Suburban Hospital Trauma Center, arriving at 1:49 p.m.

Lessons Learned from Review of Immediate Incident Response

- The actions of both the school security team leader and school nurse in assessing and recognizing the severity of the student’s injury inside the boy’s bathroom, including a determination that the student was suffering from an apparent gunshot wound coupled with life-saving measures utilizing the application of items from a close-by “Stop the Bleed Kit” saved the student’s life. The vital efforts of the school staff and the MCFRS responders and dispatch, in addition to the rapid transport to Suburban Hospital Trauma Center, played a critical role in saving the student’s life.
- There were cellular connectivity issues that prevented those on the scene of the injury from being the direct communicator with 911 dispatch, and the team at Magruder High School appropriately and effectively relayed critical information to the main office staff via walkie talkie and text message, who then relayed it to MCFRS dispatch.

- Importantly, a 911 emergency dispatcher could have been able to provide valuable “pre-arrival medical instructions” to the adults on scene that could administer life-saving first aid to an injured student prior to emergency rescue personnel.

System Follow-Up Action Taken

- Refresher emergency preparedness training has been provided to school-based administrators, school staff, and central office staff.
- Stop the Bleed/Bleeding Control training is being provided to staff that have an interest in obtaining the training, as well as a review of the kit placement in schools.
- MCFRS officials recommended that the person who calls 911 for a medical emergency be in close proximity to the injured person, when safe and practicable. This recommendation has been embedded in system-wide training with school staff.
- The Department of Infrastructure and Operations connecting with school administrators will evaluate and revise based on individual building needs as well as provide information to all staff about options for connectivity.

Lockdown Procedures

Observations

- When the school principal was informed that the injured student was likely suffering from a gunshot wound, the principal immediately ran to the main office and placed the school in a building-wide lockdown by making the announcement over the public address system. The lockdown commenced at 1:07 p.m. When the principal determined to place the school in a building-wide lockdown during this critical, life-threatening incident, when the extent of the danger was unclear, it was in alignment with the training protocols.
- Once the lockdown announcement was made, staff began to implement lockdown procedures to include the standard practice of coming outside of their classroom doors to sweep and scan for any students in the hallway who were then brought into the classroom.
- Prior to being identified as the suspect, the suspect was in the hallway and was swept into room B110 by the teacher, consistent with lockdown procedures. Once the student was swept into the classroom, the door was shut.
- The teacher and the students in room B110 did not initially have knowledge that the student swept inside the classroom was involved in the shooting.
- At 1:39 p.m., the sixth-period bell rang, and the students in room B110 were allowed to leave the classroom. The suspect did not leave the classroom.
- Students who left this classroom were redirected back into the classroom by a staff member who was close to this location, and other students returned to the classroom.
- It has been determined that a small number of school-based staff members left their lockdown locations to assist with or check in on other staff during the incident.
- It has also been determined that MCPS central office staff, who were coming to the building to support the incident, entered the building while it was still under a lockdown.

Lessons Learned from Review of Lockdown Procedures

- Placing the school into a building-wide lockdown is critical to the safety of all students and staff, when it is not known if the suspect is still in the school, on campus, or has escaped the building.
- During the lockdown, the majority of classrooms followed lockdown protocols correctly. Interviews with stakeholders and a review of security camera footage indicate that lockdown protocols were not followed in some spaces by a small number of staff members.

- The teacher in room B110, where the suspect was later apprehended, did correctly sweep and scan the hallway according to the protocol. In doing so, the suspect was swept in because at the time it was not known that they were the suspect. Later, when the 6th period bell rang at 1:39 p.m., the teacher in room B110 inappropriately released students into the hallway. It has been determined that lockdown protocols were not followed inside the room during the duration of the lockdown.
- Due in part to a lack of Unified Command, the lockdown was prolonged and there was a missed opportunity following the apprehension of the suspect and the subsequent completion of the police investigation, to transition from a lockdown to a shelter-in-place, which would have allowed for staff and students to access restrooms and receive communications in a more efficient manner once it was determined that it was safe to do so. This missed opportunity led to a premature relaxing of the lockdown protocols by some staff who were in or who entered the building. A stronger coordination in Unified Command would have allowed for the opportunity to transition from a lockdown to a shelter-in-place when appropriate and safe to do so.
- While the intent of the school-based staff members and central office staff members who operated outside of lockdown procedures was meant to be supportive, it created a potential danger for these staff members.

System Follow-Up Action Taken

- MCP and MCPS have collaborated in an ongoing joint Active Assailant Training conducted at several schools in July, August, and December of 2022. This training will continue and expand to include MCFRS and additional MCPS staff.
- School-based administrators received refresher training on lockdown and other emergency procedures, including upgrades to incident communication structures and information on how the Incident Command Structure would be deployed in future serious incidents.
- Following this training, staff across the system received an updated refresher training on serious incident protocols, including their roles and responsibilities during a lockdown.
- Similar information on emergency preparedness and roles and responsibilities of stakeholders in an emergency situation was provided to the public through community messages, and the MCPS website, [School Safety and Security Frequently Asked Questions](#) page.

Non-Traditional Investigative Procedures by School Staff, Suspect Apprehension, and Law Enforcement Investigation

Observations

- Due to the critical nature of the life-threatening incident, a significant number of MCP on-duty/off-duty officers, supervisors, detectives, command staff, and other law enforcement agency staff responded. MCP assumed command of the incident as this was a serious criminal matter.
- Once the injured student was transported to the hospital, a school administrator and the STL began to review the school's security camera to identify students who were in the bathroom and the suspect. The CEO and lead detective subsequently joined them. According to information provided by law enforcement, this review with the CEO and the detective commenced at approximately 1:36 p.m.
- School staff also reviewed social media postings that identified the name of a possible suspect.
- Using this information, school staff, with the approval of law enforcement, circulated a photograph of the suspect and asked staff to identify if the student was in their classroom. The teacher in room B110 confirmed that the student was in that classroom and provided additional details to school staff that were then shared with law enforcement.

- The information provided by the teacher to law enforcement officials and detectives was used in developing an entry strategy to apprehend the suspect. Following confirmation of the suspect's whereabouts and location within the classroom, law enforcement officials and detectives developed a plan to safely enter classroom B110 to minimize any traumatic impact on the students/teacher while taking the student into custody. MCPS central office staff gave input into how to minimize any traumatic impact on the students/teacher.
- MCP Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team officers made safe entry into the classroom, and took the student into custody without incident. SWAT officers found the student to have broken down the alleged "ghost gun" into different components that were in close proximity to the student inside the classroom and the firearm was not operational due to being broken down.
- Students and the teacher were escorted from the classroom, patted down by law enforcement for safety reasons, and moved to a location in the building where they could receive additional counseling support before being interviewed by law enforcement. It is standard law enforcement practice to conduct timely interviews of witnesses or individuals with knowledge of any aspect related to a critical life-threatening incident such as a school shooting
- Following the suspect's apprehension, law enforcement continued their investigation, identifying the location of other witnesses in the building and following up on other leads. Law enforcement did follow up on a lead of a student in possession of a laser sight, but there was no connection to the suspect or the weapon used in the shooting. In addition, the possibility of a second suspect was ruled out.
- Students inside the classroom where the suspect was located by MCP officers were subsequently interviewed by detectives as to what they may have observed. In addition, other students who were also interviewed by detectives. MCP decided to interview student witnesses without the presence of school administrators or a notice to parents. Law enforcement officials determined that, due to the incident being a life-threatening school shooting and the exigent nature of the incident, detectives were permitted to interview students without the presence of school administrators or notice to parents in order to extract needed and timely information for the safety of all. The circumstances of not knowing at that time whether or not there were additional suspects or other weapons involved created the exigent conditions for investigators to conduct these interviews. According to law enforcement officials, there were almost 30 interviews conducted.
- Once it was determined by law enforcement that there were no other suspects, the parent-child reunification process began.

Lessons Learned from Review of Investigative Procedures

- There needed to be better coordination between MCPS staff and the MCP Incident Commander, command officers, and detectives regarding who was to inform parents of the student interviews. This coordination could have led to a school staff member being present as an observer during the interviews. Part of the challenge with the interviews was the number of interviews coupled with the exigent or demanding conditions requiring the interviews to be conducted in a timely manner for the safety of all.
- Once the student involved in the shooting was taken into custody and other students who may have had knowledge of the shooting or were possible witnesses were interviewed, there could have been a discussion between MCPS on-site officials, MCP Incident Commander, and law enforcement officials as to lifting the school-wide lockdown and going to a less restrictive response action of a shelter-in-place.

- When the school was determined to be safe from any additional threats, there could have been a discussion among the same parties regarding allowing students and staff to use the bathrooms in a controlled and supportive manner.

System Follow-Up Action Taken

- MCPS administrators, school staff, and central office staff following the incident have completed emergency preparedness and response training to include the function of the Incident Command Structure along with a refresher on emergency response actions including lockdown and parent child reunification procedures.
- This training and future training will allow parties to better understand their roles in a critical-life threatening incident, in order to implement emergency response actions such as lockdowns and shelter-in-place in an efficient manner.
- The Incident Command Structure will allow school-based administrators, central office administrators, and public safety officials to work more efficiently together in addressing some of the areas addressed in this section.

Incident Command Structure

Observations

- Due to the critical life-threatening incident at Magruder High School there was a significant response by law enforcement officers, supervisors, command officers, and MCPS central office staff.
- MCP assumed overall command of the incident as this was a serious, life-threatening situation and law enforcement takes the lead on the investigation per the Community Engagement Officer Program Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).
- There was a collaborative sharing of critical information between the principal and his team with the on-scene police officials, detectives, the school CEO, and the MCP Incident Command Team so crucial decisions to effectively manage and resolve this serious incident could be made.
- Law enforcement engaged with various school staff members and MCPS central office staff members to gather information or to act upon the collected information. From the perspective of MCPS, there was no clear or cohesive structure of Unified Command between MCPS and MCP. MCP indicated during the review that they did follow their internal Incident Command Structure.
- Multiple staff members, both school-based and central office-based, reported that it was unclear throughout the incident, and afterward, who was in charge from MCPS. Aligned with this, multiple staff members indicated that the approach to leadership by central office staff was based on “hierarchy by title,” effectively removing school-based staff from critical decision-making responsibilities.

Lessons Learned from Review of Incident Command Structure

- MCPS and MCP never established a true Unified Command structure. The lack of a Unified Command structure by MCPS and between MCPS and MCP led to confusion relating to roles, responsibilities, and decision-making, as well as delays in communication and parent-child reunification.
- As additional staff from MCPS central offices arrived, there was no transfer of command from the school-based team to the central office-based team, which created confusion about who was in charge from the school system and what the roles and responsibilities of staff members were.
- There has to be a clear understanding from all parties as to who is assuming the role of school-based Incident Commander, overall District-wide Incident Commander, and the Law Enforcement Incident Commander.

- The overall process of incident management and utilization of the Incident Command System could have been more effective and efficient had all parties positioned themselves into Unified Command sooner and managed the incident from a joint command post. Administrative offices and conference rooms were utilized by both MCPS and MCP leadership to manage the incident but a Unified Command post would have allowed for a more efficient process.
- Designating an MCPS Liaison Officer assigned to the Unified Command may have allowed for a direct conversation with the MCP Incident Commander as to stepping down the lockdown sooner and shifting into a shelter-in-place, along with a more effective way to support MCP in resolving the incident.

System Follow-Up Action Taken

- MCPS has developed an Incident Command Structure that delineates the roles and responsibilities of central office and school-based staff, which minimizes the number of staff members sent to the scene of a serious incident. This structure establishes clear procedures for establishing a Unified Command.
- The Incident Command Structure also includes specific MCPS staff members' specific responsibilities and establishes clear communication lines between the various staff members who are engaged in the deployment of the Incident Command Structure.
- MCPS administrators, central office staff, senior leadership, and school security staff have received Incident Command System training that includes tabletop exercises aimed at increasing the coordination of response between MCPS, law enforcement, and fire and rescue personnel in a critical incident.
- The District-wide Incident Command Team, which exists as a component of the ICS, has been reconstituted and updated to reflect the change in new leadership positions.
- MCPS also recognizes the need to engage in an immediate, short-term, and long-term review of any serious incident to aid in adjusting serious incident response practices and to ensure that stakeholders have access to mental health and other services to address trauma incurred.
- Communications protocols have been revised and provided to school and central office administrators to guide messaging, immediately and during any school crisis. (for details see the next section)

Communication During the Incident and Parent-Child Reunification (PCR)

Observations

- During the incident MCPS sent out communications and updates to parents/guardians regarding the incident four times, 1:28 p.m., 2:11 p.m., 2:47 p.m., and 5:06 p.m.
- An additional community message was sent at 6:58 p.m. that provided information about a community meeting scheduled for the next morning.
- For a period of time during the incident, MCP advised that all communications be halted to assist with the apprehension of the suspect in the school building.
- The MCPS Department of Transportation (DOT) and the Department of Systemwide Safety and Emergency Management (DSSEM) had staged buses during the incident, preparing for dismissal.
- The Parent/Child Reunification (PCR) process began at 4:24 p.m., with the approval of law enforcement. Law enforcement was escorted by school administrators, clearing each classroom individually and moving students to a predetermined location for departure.

- Student bus riders were dismissed from the gymnasium, students in the Autism program were dismissed by bus through a separate exit, and student car riders and walkers were being queued in the auditorium.
- The last classroom was cleared by law enforcement at 5:40 p.m., and the first bus loaded shortly thereafter.
- The last bus departed at 6:25 p.m. and the last student departed from Magruder High School at 7:19 p.m. All students who rode buses were able to depart quickly and efficiently and no students were returned to the school.
- Students in the auditorium were initially processed through the designed PCR process, with parents signing their student out after showing a state-issued identification. However, as the process moved along at a slow pace, remaining students were eventually released en masse without adhering to the proper PCR process. As a result, some students were released after the incident without being signed out.
- Around 5:45 p.m., a joint press conference was held between MCP and MCPS that included an update on the situation.

Lessons Learned from Review of Communication and Parent-Child Reunification

- Communications were unclear and infrequent leading up to and during the PCR process.
- The lack of a clear Incident Command Structure resulted in confusion with the dismissal of students who drove personal vehicles or who were picked up by caregivers and friends.
- The lack of information shared with the community also caused additional stress during the PCR process as the status of the process and the specifics of the process were not shared.
- The lack of communication also made it appear that the PCR process was delayed as a result of the joint press conference. However, the PCR process had begun more than an hour prior to the start of the press conference.
- During the incident, and while in lockdown, the Magruder administrative team utilized email and text communications with staff to provide updates on the incident and the PCR process.
- Generic communications from MCPS should have continued as to the status of the incident/investigation to maintain trust with the community and provide updates on the status of operations. These messages needed to be crafted to not cause an action by any suspect not yet apprehended.
- The lack of communication caused misinformation and confusion for parents and students about the status and specifics of the incident as well as what they should expect with the PCR process.

System Follow-Up Action Taken

- MCPS has upgraded the approach to communication during a serious incident, and details about these upgrades were shared in the November 10, 2022, “Things to Know” message from MCPS Superintendent of Schools, Dr. Monifa B. McKnight. The commitment by the system is to use ConnectEd to share information by phone call, text, and email as soon as an incident takes place, usually within twenty minutes, and frequently throughout an incident. These messages will also be sent in multiple languages.
- The information about the MCPS commitment to communication was also shared by school principals during PTA meetings and through other weekly community messages during November 2022.
- MCPS will refrain from holding a press conference during a serious incident until the PCR process is complete. Should serious misinformation coming from the media need to be addressed, a press conference is an appropriate tool in management of correct and verified information. Staff associated with or designated by MCPS Department of Communications may participate in press

conferences held by other entities, including but not limited to MCP and MCFRS as a means of providing clear and timely information to the community.

- If public safety officials are in charge of managing the incident, the messages and updates will be approved by the public safety incident commander so as not to impact the safety of students, staff, and responders.
- Due to the non-traditional investigative techniques of the Magruder administrative team, the lockdown protocols in MCPS have been adjusted to include options for internal communication via mobile device, when determined that it is safe to do so.
- MCPS has developed generic communication scripts that may be shared with the community during serious incidents to provide real-time updates frequently throughout.

Post-Incident Response, Mental Health Supports, Review Process

Observations

- The Central Office Crisis Team responded to Magruder High School and worked with the school administrators and central office staff to develop a support plan, and provided mental health/counseling support as needed for students and staff impacted by the overall incident that day. Part of the plan was to support students who were in classroom B110 when the SWAT team made entry.
- MCPS senior leadership and members of the Central Office Crisis Team developed plans for a virtual community meeting to be held at 1:00 p.m. on Saturday, January 22, 2022, to further discuss the incident as well as recovery and support efforts for students, staff, parents, and the school community. There was not enough time for the community to ask questions about the incident and next steps in the recovery process.
- Recovery and support plans were developed to address the emotionality of the incident for when students and staff returned to Magruder High School on January 25, 2022, as January 24, 2022, was a professional day for teachers
- Upon return to school on January 25, 2022, there was a large support team of Central Office Crisis Team members and central office support staff to assist in the recovery process for students and staff. Trauma-informed psychoeducation sessions were held with students to assist in the recovery process and representatives of the MCPS Employee Assistance Program met with staff to assist in their recovery process. Mental health support staff maintained a presence at Magruder High School throughout the week as part of the recovery plan.
- The school's CEO and other sheriff deputies were assigned each day at Magruder High School following the shooting, for a four-week period, as part of the recovery process to ensure students, staff, and parents felt safe returning to school following such a serious incident.

Lessons Learned from Review of Post-Incident Procedures

- In any serious incident, it is important to regularly engage with the principal, administrators, the counseling team, school psychologist, staff, students, and parents to continuously assess the impact of trauma, mental health supports, and outreach to determine if those needs are being met in a timely manner in order to adjust the recovery and support plan. This engagement is especially critical in the months following a serious incident.
- It is also important to ensure needed support and assistance is provided by a variety of caregivers to impacted students, staff, and parents. In addition, a MCPS primary point of contact will be provided to those impacted by the traumatic incident.
- Post-incident mental health and well-being support must continue well beyond the incident and must include internal and external mental health partners.

System Follow-Up Action Taken

- MCPS has developed enhanced strategies and outreach support measures to better support students, staff, and families involved in these types of critical life-threatening incidents. Under the new Incident Command Structure, communications are sent to administrators in cluster and other schools, as needed, to provide relevant information about a serious incident. This will enable school leaders to provide any needed social emotional or other support to impacted community members.
- These measures include development of an action plan to deal with the trauma experienced by those affected by the incident and this includes support from the Montgomery County Department of Health and Human Services as coordinated with MCPS central office liaison to the Department of Health.
- An MCPS primary point of contact will be appointed, as a component of the Incident Command Structure, to coordinate needed outreach and support to those impacted by the traumatic incident.
- Mental health support and recovery support is part of the District-wide Incident Command Team Recovery Section and a comprehensive approach is taken to support schools, students, staff, and parents that experienced a significant critical incident or emergency.

Summary

It is clear that the response by the Magruder High School team on January 21, 2022, saved the life of one of their students. Given the nature and severity of this incident, MCPS has gleaned a tremendous amount of information from a review of the incident that day which has positively impacted the approach by the system in responding to serious incidents and securing much-needed mental health services for stakeholders. MCPS recognizes that there were elements of the response that day that did not go well, and adjustments and upgrades have been made to the incident command and serious incident structures as a result. We further recognize and are pleased to provide this addendum that gives greater clarity and transparency to all of the issues raised throughout the community engagement and review, building on the information provided in the original After-Action Report submission dated May 13, 2022.

Questions regarding the After-Action Report Addendum can be addressed to MCPS Chief Safety Officer, Edward A. Clarke, at edward_a_clarke@mcpsmd.org or 240-740-3066.

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Magruder High School January 21, 2022 Incident Timeline

